China is supporting the Houthis. Here’s how the Trump administration can respond.

With the Houthis in Yemen aggressively targeting Israel and international shipping, the incoming Trump administration should put China’s support for the Houthis and their patron Iran high on the bilateral agenda between Washington and Beijing. For too long, China has acted like a free rider in the Red Sea, taking advantage of the protection that US warships have provided these important waterways while resourcing the Houthis and Iran. The incoming US administration, in coordination with US allies, could weaken this nexus by pressing this issue with Beijing.
How China helps the Houthis

How does China support the Houthis? To begin with, it does so by purchasing large quantities of Iranian oil. In a recent report, United Against Nuclear Iran found that Tehran exported 587 million barrels of oil in 2024, which was an increase of 10.75 percent over 2023. Over the past four years, Iran exported a total of nearly 1.98 billion barrels of oil, and its annual oil exports have quadrupled during the Biden administration. China is Iran’s biggest customer, with more than 90 percent of Iran’s exports going to China in 2024.

As a result of these exports, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reportedly received as much as half of the fifty billion dollars in oil revenue that Iran earned last year. In turn, the IRGC uses its funds to support its proxies, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. As recently as January 11, the Wall Street Journal revealed that Iran exported nearly three million barrels of oil from storage facilities in China with Beijing’s unprecedented approval, further filling the IRGC’s coffers.

China appears to be supporting the Houthis beyond Iranian oil revenue, too. US intelligence sources recently told Israeli media that since November 2023, the Houthis have used Chinese-made components to target Red Sea vessels in exchange for immunity for Chinese-flagged ships. This comes after multiple US Treasury announcements in 2024, which added a dozen Chinese, Iranian, and Houthi entities to the US sanctioned lists for acquiring, funding, smuggling, and providing dual-use and military-grade materials to the Houthis. (The Chinese embassy in Tel Aviv has “categorically denied” the allegations.)

Beijing initially backed United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning Houthi actions after the group took power in the 2014-15 Yemeni coup. However, since the Houthis resumed attacks in November 2023 on shipping and on Israel, China’s response has been more muted. Beijing has abstained from and sought to water down recent resolutions, and it has distanced itself from the United States and from US allies and partners on this issue.

While officially recognizing the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, the executive body of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, Beijing maintains unofficial ties with the Houthis. Since 2015, it has taken part in United Nations-sponsored peace talks, and it hosted a Houthi delegation in 2016. In 2023, the Houthis signed an economic agreement with China’s Anton Oilfield Group, which was terminated shortly thereafter.
What China risks by supporting the Houthis

Even with its support, Beijing remains vulnerable to the risks that Houthi attacks pose in the Red Sea. Over half of China’s oil originates in the Middle East and North Africa, with nearly all shipments transiting Red Sea chokepoints that are now imperiled by Houthi attacks. These vital waterways also support China’s trade with Europe, which accounts for 21 percent of its total exports.

Houthi disruptions to maritime shipping have forced some major carriers to suspend or reroute services via the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks and approximately one million dollars in fuel costs per journey, along with a 30 percent rise in ancillary expenses.

A recent study by the Bank of Israel noted that between December 2023 and early 2024, Red Sea trade volume dropped by 10 percent, with maritime imports falling by 20 percent among littoral states. Although a partial recovery began by March 2024 as the shipping industry adapted, the damage to exporters’ bottom lines persists.

Chinese-linked vessels have also come under Houthi fire, even if mistakenly. In February 2024, the Houthis damaged four submarine cables, one linking China with the West. The following month, the group launched anti-ship ballistic missiles at a Chinese-owned tanker. Then in July, two more tankers carrying Russian produce destined for China were similarly attacked.

Indirect losses have hit China as regional hubs critical to its trade face severe disruptions. For example, as of September 2024, transshipment traffic at Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah Port had nearly vanished, and Jeddah Port operations more than halved in the first half of the year, as did the Suez Canal’s.

In late 2023 and early 2024, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and other US officials urged China to cooperate against Houthi attacks. Yet, as outgoing Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said in October 2024, Beijing not only rejected US requests but also encouraged the Iranian-backed rebels to attack other countries’ ships.

China’s reported agreement with the Houthis may have encouraged the country’s shipping industry to take the high-risk route in order to capitalize on reduced competition. By January 2024, Lloyd’s List data showed a notable increase in the proportion of China-linked tonnage passing through the Red Sea, with seventeen out of twenty-seven vessels making port calls in Russia. By September 2024, China-linked vessels stood out as outliers in maintaining transits in the strategic chokepoints, even as global traffic through the region remained far below normal levels.
How does China view the Houthi attacks?

While the Chinese government is often opaque in its decision-making, it is useful to survey of what some leading Chinese analysts are saying. In response to a January 2024 Reuters report that China used its economic leverage on Iran to pressure the Houthis to cease their attacks on shipping, Li Shaoxian, a leading Chinese analyst and a former vice president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (a Ministry of State Security–linked think tank), dismissed it as “total nonsense.” Chinese analysts broadly argue that Beijing, despite its global influence and clandestine ties with the Houthis, has no pressing reason to assist the United States or the international community against the group.

First, some Chinese analysts argue that China has limited leverage over Iran and the Houthis, a view echoed by some non-Chinese scholars. However, this perspective overlooks China’s critical economic ties, its geopolitical support for Tehran, and its exports of military and dual-use components. Together, these grant Beijing a significant degree of influence over Tehran and, by extension, its proxies.

Second, China strategically benefits from free riding on the US security umbrella in the Middle East. As China conserves resources, the United States struggles to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The added drain of US blood, treasure, and credibility is just the cherry on top for Beijing. Elbridge Colby, the incoming administration’s nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy, put it succinctly in October 2024: “Why would China help us address the Houthis problem when it obviously distracts and depletes us?”

Third, some Beijing officials seem to view the Middle East crisis as confined to the Levant, while China’s interests in the Persian Gulf remain largely intact, despite the ongoing war in Gaza and the overthrow of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.

Tang Zhichao of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues, for example, that better Saudi-Iran relations after Beijing’s March 2023 mediation—including agreements on the Houthis and joint maritime drills—reduce the need for outside intervention. Meanwhile, scholars such as Wu Bingbing with Peking University, who referred to the regional situation as a “storm in a teapot,” contend that the Middle East as a whole is still stable.

Finally, China seems to believe that opposing the Houthis risks Beijing being perceived as supporting a globally unpopular Israel or submitting to US leadership. This would seem to contradict Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s contention that “the East is rising and the West is declining,” while undercutting China’s vision for a “new security architecture in the Middle East.” Yun Sun of the Stimson Center and the Brookings Institution summarizes this position as the “three ‘no’s” dictum: “no cooperation, no support, and no confrontation.” And as the shipping industry adjusts to the disruptions, Beijing can absorb some losses, as long as the United States and its allies lose more.
How Trump can pressure China on the Houthis

President-elect Donald Trump has expressed optimism that “China can help” resolve Russia’s war in Ukraine, echoing the Biden administration’s hope for cooperation on global peace and stability. However, just as Beijing is unlikely to exert meaningful pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin for his invasion of Ukraine, US policymakers should not expect real assistance from China against Iran or the Houthis.

The Chinese government is operating as if it views Trump’s efforts to end the Middle East’s “forever wars,” expand the Abraham Accords (including Israeli-Saudi integration), and renew pressure on Iran as bids to create a “Middle Eastern NATO,” which is aimed at preserving “US hegemony” and countering China. Accordingly, Yun highlighted in December that Beijing sees Iran as a “strong pillar” in its strategy to counter US dominance in the region.

In bilateral talks, the incoming Trump administration should directly address Chinese support for the Houthis. Publicly and privately, US diplomats must press Beijing to curtail arms sales, dual-use exports, and illicit financing to the group. At the same time, the US government should declassify intelligence showing Chinese support for the Houthis and release it before the United Nations Security Council and other international fora to establish Beijing’s complicity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Washington need not act alone in this. The United States can distribute the operational burden more effectively by fostering a renewed security architecture with partners such as Israel, the Gulf states, Egypt, India, and other countries in Asia. This framework should prioritize a coordinated response to Chinese support for the Houthis and Iran’s destabilizing activities.

Coordination could include intelligence sharing, secondary sanctions, and robust enforcement targeting Chinese entities. Strategic messaging must highlight Beijing’s role in enabling groups that threaten international shipping and regional stability in contravention of international sanctions. Countries in this coalition should reevaluate their relations with China and insist on meaningful changes in its support for the Houthis and Iran.

The door for cooperation with China should remain open, as some voices in China still advocate for Sino-US collaboration in the volatile Middle East. Moreover, some Chinese commentators, including Sun Degang, director of the Center for Middle Eastern studies at Fudan University, have recognized that the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance is losing.”

In addition to pressing Beijing on its support in discussions, Trump could consider working with allies and partners to strike Houthi leadership in Yemen and IRGC military targets on Iranian soil. The Biden administration mostly focused on degrading radars, missile launchers, and command-and-control sites, as well as intercepting drones and missiles. A more robust policy would have included targeted actions against Houthi leadership, such as the movement’s leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, and Muhammad Ahmad al-Talibi, who reportedly oversees procurement efforts for the Houthis and liaises with Iran. Working with Israel, the new US administration should devote intelligence resources to decapitating Houthi leadership, as Israel did against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Additionally, Trump should authorize strikes against Iranian targets, specifically IRGC surveillance ships, such as the MV Behshad, which reportedly provide targeting data for the Houthis. Other targets could include Iranian ports that ship weaponry to the Houthis; training facilities such as the Khamenei Academy of Naval Sciences and Technology, where Houthis receive advanced instruction; and senior IRGC commanders on the ground in Yemen, such as Abdolreza Shahlai.

Such shifts in posture could be more effective in deterring the Houthis, as they will eliminate individuals with important relationships and networks while also increasing the pain for their patrons in Iran. By proactively degrading Houthi and Iranian capabilities and deterring their patrons, the incoming Trump administration, together with US allies and partners, could strengthen regional stability and safeguard critical waterways.

Tuvia Gering is a cyber-threat intelligence analyst at Planet Nine, a visiting fellow at the Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program.